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ESSAY
THE CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE OF
ROBERT E. RODES, JR.
Thomas L. Shaffer*
Hope is the power of being cheerful in circumstances we know to be desperate.
-G.K. Chesterton'
When I had the chance to leave law practice and become a full-
time law teacher, I turned, in the time-honored fashion, for advice
from my law teachers. The most memorable and persistent of these-
the most cheerful, too, and therefore the most hopeful-was Robert
E. Rodes, Jr., then a young (36), transplanted New Yorker, Harvard
law graduate, and Boston lawyer. He had already come to flourish, in
the Aristotelian sense, in the Midwest-in a Catholic university known
more for its football players than for its lawyers.
Rodes told me he had come to teaching and to Notre Dame be-
cause he wanted a contemplative life-not an obvious vocation for the
father of seven, teaching four sections of law classes per semester,
faculty advisor for the law review, and already a prolific scholar.2
Thirty-five years later those who continue to learn from him, as his
seventieth birthday has come and gone, would guess that he has done
what he wanted to do when he came to Notre Dame in 1956, and that
this is nowhere more evident than in his unique theological
jurisprudence.
In the spring of 1995, a group of Rodes's friends read through his
work in jurisprudence and gathered to talk with him about it and
* Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Notre
Dame; Supervising Attorney, Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic. I am grateful for the
assistance ofJames T. Burtchaell, Linda Harrington, Brian Nettleingham, Lucy Payne,
Janet Rose, Mary Seytre, Brian Shaffer, and Nancy Shaffer.
1 G.K. CHFTTON, HEREIcs (1905), reprinted in 1 THE COLLEGCTE WORKS OF
G.E. CHESTERTON 37, 125 (David Dooley ed., 1986).
2 See Appendix, infra note 116, for a list of Rodes's publications.
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about his current (seventh) book, Pilgrim Law.3 That book and what
these friends said to one another in 1995 are the basis of these
reflections.
1. RODES'S THEORY OF HISTORY
"My awareness of the inadequacy of traditional legal categories is
... more academic than experiential," he writes. "My intellectual for-
mation in the law was dominated by sociological jurisprudence articu-
lated in technological metaphors like 'social engineering' and 'legal
apparatus.' Legal scholars of my generation had a substantial hope of
improving society by deploying our professional skills in much the
same way civil engineers hope to improve the highway system by de-
ploying theirs. It was a serious disappointment when we had been at it
for some years to find that the hoped-for improvements did not come
about as rapidly and as unambiguously as the Indiana Toll Road."4
The negative end of Rodes's changing his mind has been in his
theory of history -a matter, as I read it, of his jurisprudence being
corrected by his study of liberation theology and by the three decades
of careful work that went into his three-volume study of the estab-
lished church in England, a study in which the focus of his interest has
been not so much in the government as in the church: "My interest is
that of a Christian looking at the role of the church in society, rather
than a student of society looking at the effect of the church on soci-
ety.... When church and society part company, I go with the church,
and not with society."5
Which is to say that he looked at the legal solutions compounded
by American sociological jurisprudence both as a realist who saw that
the solutions crafted by social engineering don't seem to work out,
and often make things worse, and as one who trusts the God of his-
tory, a God Whose purposes are, if benevolent, nonetheless mysteri-
ous. Rodes came to understand that yesterday's political, economic,
3 ROBERT E. RODES, JR., PILGRIM LAW (forthcoming 1998).
4 Id. at xi-xii.
5 Recorded conversation of Michael J. Baxter, David B. Burrell, James T. Burt-
chaell, Drew Christiansen, Frederick J. Crosson, Patrick D. Gaffney, John H. Garvey,
Richard H. Helmholz, Vinodh Jaichard, Mary Kate Kearney, Douglas W. Kmiec,
Thomas Kohler, William M. Lewers, David T. Link, John R. Martzell, Anjelika Muel-
ler, John T. Noonan, Jr., Mary Lee Noonan, Leo J. O'Brien, Gerard Powers, John H.
Robinson, David Rodes, Jane Rodes, Jeanne Rodes, Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Maura A.
Ryan, Thomas L. Shaffer, Paul Titus, Paul J. Weithman, and John Howard Yoder at
the University of Notre Dame (March 25, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Conversation].
[VOL. 73:3
1998] CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE OF ROBERT E. RODES, JR. 739
and legal solutions are the recurrent source of today's dilemmas and
tragedies: History is both ambivalent and intractable.
The positive end is the faith that the Lord nonetheless wants Bob
Rodes's law students to do what they perceive needs to be done-"to
pursue an unknown end by inefficacious means."6 In 1995, he and his
friends, at the end of the day (literally), expressed this in a limerick
Rodes quotes to his students but cannot account for:
God's world made a hopeful beginning
But man marred his chances by sinning.
We trust that the story
Will end in God's glory,
But at present the other side's winning.7
His students-many of whom now send their children to learn
law from him-cannot see very far down the road to the Eschaton, but
they can see some of the way, enough to notice what the Second Vati-
can Council referred to as the joys, the hopes, the griefs, and the anxi-
eties of the children of this age." Such lawyers' "work is a practical way
of loving our neighbors. God calls us to it and blesses it." He and his
students can learn "well enough to recognize an obstacle when we see
one."'
0
The obstacles (and, I suppose, the opportunities) are in signifi-
cant part institutional, which means that they are in significant part
the product of lawyers' work and therefore vulnerable, in significant
part, to lawyers' resistance and subversion. "[D] oing what we can to
reform or dismantle them is an act ofjustice to people whose achieve-
ment of their God-given destiny is impeded by them.... [It] is often a
matter of making or applying laws in ways that our professional train-
6 RODES, supra note 3, at 11; cf Karl Rahner, Utpia and Reality, 32 THEOLOGY
DIG. 139, 142 (1985), quoted and discussed in Paul G. Crowley, S.J., Rahner's Christian
Pessimism: A Response to the Sorrow of AIDS, 58 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 286, 299 (1997).
We come from a beginning we did not choose and go to an end that is lost
in God .... We never know with ultimate certitude how we relate with our
freedom to the inescapable situation of our existence; we have to accept our
beginning, give our ultimate love to the end we call God, and with hope
leave whether or not we do it in God's hands.
Id.
7 Conversation, supra note 5. "I learned it in college," he said. "I have no idea
from whom." Id.
8 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in
the Modem World, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DocumETArrunY HEUTAGE 166
(DavidJ. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
9 RODES, supra note 3, at 12.
10 Id
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ing has shown us."'" In the conversation, he said: "The role of the
individual in historical change is neither to advance it nor to resist it,
but to enhance the good and resist the evil within it.... The pursuit
of social justice is eschatologically validated; it need not be empirically
validated. The attempt to bring about justice in society is one to
which God calls us, and which He blesses, and which will be ultimately
successful, not because it is inherently capable of accomplishing what
it sets out to accomplish, but because of God's gratuitous will to bring
about His Kingdom .... From there you get the pursuit of social
justice as the reform of the institutions of society."' 2
The obstacles, the confrontation of obstacles, and the fact that
today's solutions bring tomorrow's problems are, to Rodes, evidence
of the tragic nature of human life. He appeals then, finally, to his
faith, a faith that, as the sixteenth-century rabbi Judah Loew ben
Bezalel said, "God listens to the weeping that teaches Him about the
world He has created."1 3 Rodes's appeal is in part to what he calls
"pilgrim law," a jurisprudence that recognizes life in this world as an
open-ended pilgrimage, and "opposes any philosophy, any politics, or
any jurisprudence that commits individuals or humanity in general to
a known and therefore spurious destiny, or to no destiny at all."' 4
Part of Rodes's scholarlyjourney has been an interest in Marxism
and an acceptance both of Marxist class analysis (which Rodes calls
"class dialectic" rather than "class warfare," for reasons that will ap-
pear) and of significant parts of Marx's and Engels's reading of his-
tory.'5 For example, Rodes identifies, throughout western history, the
existence and influence of ruling classes and the tendency of the rul-
ing classes to use both their political ideology and the law they preside
over to serve their own ends. He recognizes the enduring presence of
false consciousness16 and hegemony as protections of ruling-class ide-
ology. And he identifies as the principal apostolic business of Chris-
tian jurisprudence-the work of lawyers and judges-confronting the
11 Id.
12 Conversation, supra note 5.
13 AVIVAH GOTTLIEB ZORNBERG, GENESIS: THE BEGINNING OF DESIRE 376 (1995).
14 RODES, supra note 3, at 13.
15 Rodes acknowledges HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW (1984), as his principal
source on Marxist theory-along with Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the
Communist Party, in BAsIc WRITINGS ON Pourrlcs AND PHILOSOPHY 1 (Lewis S. Feuer
ed., 1959).
16 Collins defines Marxist notions about false consciousness in terms of ruling-
class ideology, citing two perspectives:
(i) the epistemological: "[A111 knowledge is false consciousness or at
least.., the present dominant conceptions of the world are false and only
Marxism has truly understood reality"; and
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insular power of ruling classes, in service to the exploited classes and
particularly in service to the poor. "If [Marx's and Engels's] account
of the succession of dominant classes has to be taken with a grain of
salt," he says, "it still has to be taken."
17
He does not, of course, accept Marxist teleology. Rodes does not
foresee a utopian epoch in which there will be no classes, and he goes
beyond Marx's description, to hold that the existence of a ruling class
is inevitable. But he also reads history to say, as to the "values" of the
ruling class, that class follows values (not the other way around) and
that ruling-class values are not always and everywhere as narrowly self-
serving as Marx thought they were. He is cheerful in circumstances he
knows to be desperate because he hangs on to a Catholic (andJewish)
view of human nature, and to his own version of a theology of hope,
more than to Marxist determinism.
These two modifications-the inevitability of a ruling class, and a
modified account of class instrumentalism' 8-lay the groundwork for
a jurisprudence of lawyering that Rodes sums up by saying that the
proper business of the law is to make the ruling class (whatever it hap-
pens to be at the time) accountable. They are two of the four pillars of
his jurisprudence. (The other two pillars are his somewhat unique
account of natural law and his appeal to what he calls "transcendent
values.") His object in Pilgrim Law, he says, is to describe "a relativized
class structure within a context of wholly or partially transcendent val-
ues."19 He celebrates, then, not only a positive view of the human
person but also an optimistic view of lawyering: "Whatever we believe
in, whatever we have been, whatever we wish to be, when the time
comes for us to choose out of the available material specific principles
(ii) using the metaphor of reflection: "[G]ultural achievements, scientific
ideas, religious and legal thought [are] all merely reflections of the relations
of production."
CoLLINs, supra note 15, at 35-36. Marx himself (whom Collins quotes) held that so-
cial being determines consciousness, so that ideas, knowledge, and motivation are
constructed in response to practical experiences. That is, it is experience that drives
history, not ideas. See iL at 37.
By the way, Marxist analysis has of late attracted surprising allies, not least of
which are Wall Street and Pope John Paul II (before he became pope). See; e.g., John
Cassidy, The Return of Karl Marx, NEw YoRKER, Oct. 20 & 27, 1997, at 248; Jonathan
Kwitny, Neither Capitalist Nor Marxist: Karol Wjtyla's Social Ethics, COMMONWEAL, Oct.
10, 1997, at 17.
17 RODES, supra note 3, at 31.
18 Rodes follows COLLINS, supra note 15, at 27-28, who treats class instrumental-
ism as it applies to the law. For Marx, Engels, and Lenin, law was a creation of the
state apparatus to further the ends of the ruling class.
19 RODES, supra note 3, at xv.
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for the ordering of our life together, we draw on the skills of the legal
profession." 20
II. THE NEW CLAss
This is a high view of lawyering, but also, as one might expect
from a contemplative thinker, a penitential view, one that focuses on
the fact that lawyers and most of their clients are at present the ruling
class which Rodes's jurisprudence seeks to make accountable. The
ruling class today, in all of Europe and the New World, is not the
landholder or the capitalist of Marxist analysis, but the apparachik-
the manager and the lawyer. Rodes makes recurrent and creative use
of Milovan Djilas's The New Class.2 1 Djilas's startling thesis was that in
European socialist economies, capitalism had been replaced, not by
the classless rule of the proletariat, but by bureaucrats. (Discussions
of Djilas were prominent in the essays that were used by members of
the 1995 conversation.)
Rodes applies Djilas's analysis to capitalist economies and then
adds traditional Jewish and Christian morality on the uses of wealth
and power. We lawyers, for example, as we live well and as we use
power we do not have, are among the principal beneficiaries of class
injustice; and, he says, 'We should be no more content with being
oppressors than we would be with being oppressed."22 We American
lawyers, as much as the growing underclass in the economy of the
United States, are captives of class injustice, and we, as much as the
underclass, stand in need of liberation from it: "It is this principle of
joint liberation that reconciles participation in an ongoing class strug-
gle with a Christian commitment to universal brotherhood and soli-
darity."23 Rodes in this way can appeal to the scriptural concepts of
forgiveness of enemies and stewardship of wealth and power, both to
explain circumstantial (or historical) advantage and to point to moral
principles that, in less subtle hands, might come across as noblesse
oblige.
If Rodes approaches the Marxist doctrine of class instrumental-
ism 24 with caution, he nonetheless recognizes that Marxist characteri-
20 Id. at 3.
21 MILOVAN DJILAS, THE NEW CLASS (1957).
22 RODES, supra note 3, at 23.
23 Id. at 24.
24 See, e.g., EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARXSM: A GENERAL THEORY (Bar-
bara Einhom trans. & Chris Arthur eds., Ink Links 1978) (1929); JOSE PORFIuuO MI-
RANDA, MARX AND THE BIBLE: A CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF OPPRESSION (1974).
Rodes identifies what Djilas called the "new class" under socialism with the "manage-
rial class" in so-called free-market economies. Rodes's historical analysis is similar in
[VOL- 73:3
19981 CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE OF ROBERT E. RODES, JR. 743
zations on the validity and the uses of ruling-class morals are accurate
more often than not. "If, for instance, we enroll industrialists in our
ruling class, it is because we want to motivate more people to become
industrialists . . . to practice the supposed virtues of. . . ambition,
resourcefulness, and hard work; or because we consider people with
those virtues morally superior to other people.
"Rationales of this kind presuppose first that positions of wealth
and power are in fact occupied by people who meet the ostensible
criteria for occupying them, and second that those criteria are them-
selves just and reasonable. Neither presupposition is very realistic....
[What] will prevail in a given time and place depends on historical
many ways to the analysis of "managerial capitalism" among students of business, most
notably that of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.:
As technology became more sophisticated and as markets expanded, admin-
istrative coordination replaced market coordination in an increasingly larger
portion of the economy. By the middle of the twentieth century the salaried
managers of a relatively small number of larger mass producing, larger mass
retailing, and large mass transporting enterprises coordinated current flows
of goods through the processes of production and distribution and allocated
the resources to be used for future production and distribution in major
sectors of the American economy. By then, the managerial revolution in
American business had been carried out.
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE EssENTiL AALFRED CHANDLER: ESSAYS TOWARD A HsToR-
IcAL THEORY OF BIG BusiNiEss 396 (Thomas I. McCraw ed., 1988). Chandler's analysis
depends on size and complexity, and size and complexity depend on growth that is
consequent on capitalistic success. He does not use class analysis, but he could. His
"new class" would grow out of historical circumstance, the key economic development
in which appears to be the decline of what he and other scholars call "market
coordination."
Another of these scholars, William Lazonick, focuses on what Rodes calls ac-
countability and sees a significant shift in American business from discipline within
organizations to the discipline of professional groups, so that experts move from en-
terprise to enterprise. They move between systems of accountability without leaving
the managerial class; Lazonick appears to regret the transition:
[T]he historical significance of managerial capitalism is that there was a time
when the strategic managers of U.S. industrial corporations were also disci-
plined by their membership in their own business organizations and saw
their own individual success as dependent on the long-term growth and sta-
bility of the organization as a whole. That also happened to be a time when
U.S. industry dominated the international economy.
William Lazonick, Controlling the Market to Corporate Control: The Historical Significance of
Managerial Capitalism, in EN rarPaNEU srim', TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, AND Eco-
NOMIC GROWTH: STUDIES IN SCHUMPETERIAN TRADITION 153, 194 (Frederic M. Scherer
& Mark Perlman eds., 1992).
I am grateful to Professor Brian C. Shaffer, who brought this parallel to my atten-
tion; to Brian Netdleingham, who worked it out for me; and to Professor Nancy F.
Koehn.
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developments related very tenuously, if at all, to the deserts of those
affected" 25
The managerial elite took control of western capitalistic societies
because capitalists became dependent on the managers of their
wealth, as it took control of socialist societies because the proletariat
lacked the skills for implementing the revolution; both capitalists and
revolutionaries needed surrogates, administrative experts. "Where
nineteenth century capitalists had hired their managers as they did
the rest of their work force, twentieth century managers were hiring
their capital as they did their labor. Managers were still theoretically
responsible to their investors, but the responsibility sat no more heav-
ily upon them than responsibility to the workers sat on the managers
of the Sverdlovsk Motor Works or the Odessa Bread Trust."26
The managerial ruling class may some day, in either or both
economies, be replaced with some other kind of ruling class. But in
that event there will still be a ruling class. "Djilas has permanently put
out of the running any hope that the solution to the class struggle is to
abolish one or more of the participating classes. The best we can
hope for is that the ruling class will use its advantages for the benefit
of the whole society.... IT] his is what we should be trying to accom-
plish with our laws." 27
Invocation of false consciousness and hegemony have been im-
portant in Rodes's teaching-of students from upper-middle-class
families who can pay or borrow the cost of private legal education-as
well as in his scholarship. His annual short talk to law students who
use some of their winter break time to visit legal services offices and
police stations, for example, has for years used the anecdotal exam-
ples of false consciousness that now appear in Pilgrim Law.
But it is history that lives for Rodes, not anecdotes. He strides
across the centuries as confidently as he walks along the paths by the
lakes at Notre Dame. 28 When he writes about the feudal ideology of
25 RODES, supra note 3, at 25.
26 Id. at 35.
27 Id. at 36.
28 Richard Helmholz on the one side, and Rodes andJohn T. Noonan, Jr. on the
other, had a passing exchange during the conversation on the way lawyers write his-
tory. Helmholz said:
Historians criticize lawyers who write about the past. Commonly they say
that they just see the past as precedent for the future. They miss all of the
economic and social factors that really determine things. The law has never
really been autonomous and so it... shouldn't be looked at in isolation.
Conversation, supra note 5. He gave as a small example Rodes's account of Erastian-
ism within the Church of England: Rodes "pushes the doctrine ... further than it
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Providence he could be speaking-he no doubt sometimes is-to his
students, about their third- or fourth-generation-immigrant, suburban
families: "God was seen to have more of a hand in your being born to
a particular set of parents than in your gaining wealth and power by
skill, patronage, or hard work."29 When he identifies the false con-
sciousness of industrial capitalism he confronts a cherished, persis-
tent, American point of view: ["T]he wrongs that could not be put
right within the fundamental restraints of a market economy ... were
[are] solemnly declared to be inevitable, or were [are] not addressed
at al." 3°
It is when he talks about managerialism that he gets closest to the
modern American hegemony of his students: ["'What is axiomatic is
The System.... Each individual has a particular part to play in this
overall enterprise. The concerns addressed are too vast and too com-
plicated for anyone to understand exactly where his or her particular
piece of the puzzle fits in, but things will go generally well if everyone
works according to plan.
"It follows that people who act in accordance with approved pro-
cedures are not to be held accountable for the consequences of what
they do. This principle ... leads a lawyer to feel no responsibility for
succeeding by superior advocacy in returning an abused child to the
should be pushed [and] loses touch with the voices within the church that were call-
ing for the independence of the church." Id.
However, more generally, Helmhoz does not criticize the way Rodes does legal
history:
I do think historians criticize lawyers for using legal history for precedents
for the future, but I did not mean to say that Bob had done this. In fact, I
think the reverse. His work shows a real sensitivity to the times about which
he is writing. He does not look at law in isolation. This is one of the
strengths of his work.
Id- On the remark about Erastianism, Helmholz later added, "This is a matter of
emphasis. It does not.., suggest that Bob had fallen into the trap of simply looking
at history as a large source of precedents for modem problems." Id. Helmholz later
wrote that he regrets not having said more in the conversation about Rodes's history
of the Church of England as "a real accomplishment (as a historical work)." Letter
from Richard H. Helmholz, Ruth Wyatt Rosenson Professor of Law, University of Chi-
cago, to Thomas L. Shaffer, Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus,
University of Notre Dame (Sept. 23, 1997) (on file with the author).
In any event, Noonan defended his fellow lawyer-historian: "There are advan-
tages in seeing an idea in its various forms [as 'vertical' historians do]. Horizontal
historians usually miss the nuances, because they haven't seen the antecedents." And,
in any event, "Most historians are inhibited about the law." Conversation, supra note
5.
29 RODES, supra note 3, at 57.
30 Id at 58.
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custody of an abusive parent. Or a high school principal to feel no
responsibility for graduating students who cannot read... [ or] insur-
ance claims representatives [to] pursue a lawsuit to its bitter end even
though both sides are insured by the same company ....
"What the moral authority of the hereditary elite was to feudal-
ism, and what the inviolability of property and contract was to capital-
ism, the internal integrity of The System is to managerialism. The
deployment of managerial skills to make The System better is to be
commended, but efforts to bypass it are to be condemned."3
III. THE PRACTICE OF LAW
The persistence of The System, in recent American legal history
and in the law practices that Rodes's students will take up, has become
part of ordinary law-classroom legal principle. It is in the hornbooks
and cases law students read as the stuff of legal education:
- The feudal understanding of property was that it was God-
given; "the Roman law understanding of property as that which is sub-
ject to my will is incorporated into the liberal understanding of what
scope my will should have."3 2
* "The courts have tended to accord to corporations the same
protections they give natural persons, without paying much attention
to the fact that corporate managers [and the lawyers who serve them]
are the only natural persons who actually profit from the protection
they give." 33
* Modern managerialism serves itself by making values private:
"Since liberal ideology offers no governing value by
which... contradictions and inconsistencies may be resolved, it does
nothing to check the natural tendency to resolve them in favor of the
ruling class," in which lawyers are prominent members. 34
* "Since the power of the managerial class is based on expertise,
and since an ideology is the only thing a lay person can call on to
challenge an expert, [modern] ideological neutrality became a power-
ful force for the prevention of accountability."35
* The liberal ideologies of freedom and equality that lawyers pro-
tect "in the end ... make freedom a principle that members of the
31 Id. at 61-62.
32 Id. at 64.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 68.
35 Id. at 66. I think of the fact that law schools are the most secular places-the
places where ideological neutrality is the most prominent dogma-on university
campuses.
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ruling class should not be interfered with in the use of their privileges,
and equality a principle that no differences count except those that
characterize the ruling class."8s 6
* Managerial ideology says that "positions in society should be
assigned on the basis of ability and industry without regard to either
wealth or birth. But aside from a few entertainers and ball players, the
people who have the best positions in society are managers and pro-
fessionals. Therefore, the forms of ability and industry that qualify
people for advancement are the ones characteristic of managers and
professionals."3 7
False consciousness is overcome by truthful description of ruling-
class power, and ruling-class power can be deployed morally (pace
Marx) if it is made to account to what Rodes calls "the wider society'
(prototypically because law forces the accounting and prescribes the
forms for it). The morality then examined, by managers and their
lawyers (for example) who have become accountable, is a morality
Rodes finds in his account of natural law and in the "transcendent
values" he finds in theology, notably in the theological discipline mod-
em Roman Catholic social doctrine has come to call "the preferential
option for the poor": Because 'Judging between the ruling class and
the wider society is always done by the ruling class, an antiseptic im-
partiality in the judgment is not to be hoped for. The only way to
avoid an inadvertent bias in our own favor is to adopt a deliberate bias
the other way."38 In the conversation, he said: "A preferential option
for the poor is the remedy for false consciousness. The most impor-
tant thing, then, is that you are getting beyond the interest of your
own class.... I see it not so much as a requirement of justice as an
ascesis for the ruling class. . . . For the poor themselves, it is a
claim.... It is a method for arriving at the common good, because it
is a method for overcoming false consciousness. " s9
The apostolate Rodes identifies here for his readers and his stu-
dents is sustained by hope, by a confidence in the benevolent pur-
poses of the God of history, the benevolent Lord Who, in the end, will
triumph injustice. In this way, a modem American lawyer, who can
only see a little way down the road, but who believes that there are
things God wants her to do as she moves along that little way, can take
36 Id- at 68.
37 IM at 73.
38 I& at 103.
39 Conversation, supra note 5.
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the risk that she might be right. She can allow herself the circumstan-
tial confidence that "the pursuit of justice through law is eschatologi-
cally validated even if its historical fruition is problematical."40
In the 1995 conversation, John T. Noonan, Jr. asked Rodes about
the practice of corporate lawyers, and Paul J. Weithman asked him
about lawyer complicity in corporate evil. Rodes imagined himself
back in the general counsel's office where he practiced law in the
1950s. "If my advice... was habitually violated," he said, "I would find
myself anotherjob." I tried to match such a concrete circumstance to
his eschatology: "You are going to have to feel that, over a longer pe-
riod of time, you are going to do some good," I suggested, in my non-
directive way. Rodes said, "Um hmm. '41
What is hoped for in ordinary, prosaic, Wednesday afternoon law
practice is therefore mysterious, but it is also flagrant in mysterious
promise: "Christian eschatology does not teach us to hope for a resto-
ration of the state from which we have fallen. Rather, it speaks of a
new heaven and a new earth, and tells us that eye has not seen nor ear
heard, nor has it entered into our hearts, what good things God has
prepared for those who love Him."42
Meanwhile there are the problems, the dilemmas, and the trage-
dies: "Rodes's theological vision is driven by a commitment to univer-
sal human dignity and to the creation of social, political, and
economic conditions necessary for human flourishing-a theological
commitment that is self-conscious about the limits of human action
and even the purity of our best intentions, and that is, therefore, es-
chatological; that we are to take on as our own the griefs and anxieties
of the people of God, especially the poor," Maura Ryan said in the
conversation. "Rodes seems equally sure that when we pursue justice
in the name of those who are oppressed, we are not simply fulfilling
some spiritual duty, but honoring a universal ethical obligation. '43
The legal enterprise is, though, modest, even if it is universal.
The material available for use in the law comes more from the lawyer's
perception of human nature than from his confidence in the mysteri-
ous purposes of God: "Laws are to serve people; therefore, reflection
on human nature"-which is how Rodes understands and teaches nat-
ural law4--"will enable us to evaluate laws in terms of what they are
40 RODES, supra note 3, at xii.
41 Conversation, supra note 5.
42 RODES, supra note 3, at 11 (quoting 1 Corinthians 2:9). One of the rare in-
stances in which Rodes quotes scripture-from memory, of course.
43 Conversation, supra note 5.
44 See ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAW AND LIBERATION 7-8 (1986).
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for."45 In Pilgrim Law, Rodes provides a few of the pointers for prac-
tice that those of us who took his course in natural law remember,
from discussions there and from his 1976 book, The Legal Enterp7ise:46
0 "[C]ass privileges are never the natural order of things....
We probably cannot make them go away, but we can insist that they be
exercised in strict and continuing subordination to the values that oc-
casioned them, and to other values equally important. Law is, or
should be, the primary instrument for securing that subordination."47
9 Law is both a teacher and a doer. "To reduce the whole enter-
prise to its didactic operation will lead us to concentrate on values to
the exclusion of realizations; to reduce it to the instrumental will lead
us to do the opposite."4 8
* Law is institutional: "The drive for social justice is neither con-
tinuous nor overwhelming, but it cannot be permanently ignored. If
it is not effectively institutionalized, it will find ways, often harsh ways,
to become so."49
The ideal for practice that Rodes suggests to his students depends
on their exercise of the virtue of prudence, and not a little on the
intuitive morality he has insisted is inherent in natural-law ethics.5 0
"[H]uman purposes .... while they cannot be fully discerned, are well
enough understood to provide criteria for the law's contribution to
them."5 1 For example, not all laws serve the ruling class; there is more
to law than Marx thought there was. (This was the thesis and the sub-
stance of Rodes's 1986 monograph on liberation jurisprudence, Law
and Liberation.52 ) "[C]Ilass instrumentalism, although it is a pervasive
quality of law, is not an inherent one. Since it is pervasive, we should
try to do something about it, and, since it is not inherent, we should
be able to."5 3
Here an important Rodesian inversion of Marxist theory comes
into view-an example of how law practice calls for prudence and in-
tuition: The ruling class did not invent the legal order that sustains it;
the legal order came first, and the ruling class took advantage of it.
45 RODES, supra note 3, at xiii.
46 ROBERT E. RODES, JR., THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE (1976).
47 RODES, supra note 3, at 89.
48 Id- at 10.
49 Id. at 29.
50 See RODES, supra note 46, at 119-23.
51 RODES, supra note 3, at 123.
52 RODES, supra note 44.
53 RODES, supra note 3, at 41.
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"[CQlasses arise and take shape from the effort to implement val-
ues .... [V] alues precede class rather than the opposite as Marxists
suppose. ''54 "When a law appears on the books, the people whose in-
terest it serves seem to materialize out of nowhere. Having found a
new source of prosperity, they proceed to prosper.... It scarcely took
twenty years for new understandings of the First Amendment in the
1960s to create a flourishing pornography industry out of what was
formerly a small under-the-counter operation.... The evolution of
whole classes is a longer and more complicated process, to be sure,
but... the chronology is similar: each evolution was attributable in
great part to the effect of laws that were already in place."55
The moral impulses giving rise to laws that turned out to be op-
portunities for the ruling class were not necessarily unworthy im-
pulses, either. Many of them illustrate the ambivalence of history, that
yesterday's solutions brought today's injustices: "Laws enhancing the
power of corporate managers rested sometimes on a belief that they
would make more money for investors if left alone and sometimes on
a belief that if left alone they would consult public interests other than
making money. But any way we look at the situation, it is clear that
the legal framework for managerial ascendancy was adopted in order
to bring about greater general prosperity and a fairer distribution of
the amenities of life." 56
Reflection on the Wednesday afternoon practice of law is as sig-
nificant for the contemplative lawyer as it is for the county-seat practi-
tioner or the partner in a large urban law firm. In the conversation,
John Robinson said, "It is the ability to invest detail with meaning that
animates .. . much of Bob's historical project, and much of his juris-
prudential project.... This even goes to Bob's taste in poetry, where
he tends to like pedestrian poems about particular episodes-inordi-
nately, I would say-especially when he's reciting them to you.... In
Bob's historical work, and for sure in his jurisprudential work, Bob
delights in the 'determinations' of principles. He delights in the par-
ticular facts of human interaction, venturing from them towards tenta-
tive generalizations. In this, Bob is true to his common law roots, and
he is offering a needed corrective to the abstractions of pure
theory."57
54 Id. at 112.
55 Id. at 42-43.
56 Id. at 52.
57 Conversation, supra note 5.
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IV. "VALUES"
Rodes is an uncommonly adept wordsmith; but, nonetheless, he
uses "values," with apologies,58 in two ways that overlap and restate
one another but that he treats separately in Pilgrim Law. When he has
managed to envision a ruling class brought to accountability, and has
to turn to substantive morals for evaluating the account, he has mostly
decided that "values" means the partial and somewhat uncertain prod-
uct of natural-law thought (that is, reflection on what people are) cou-
pled with the partial (because mysterious) normative content in
orthodox Christian theology.
When he strides across history and there identifies the morals
that moved ruling classes and those who sought to confront them, he
uses a three-part analysis that divides these morals into (i) ruling-class
values (what the Marxists would call instrumental values), (ii) in-
dependent values ("that enable the wider society to examine whether
members of the ruling class are doing what they are supposed to do,
but that do not challenge either the functions or the authority of the
class"5 9), and (iii) inchoate values ("those that enter into the prise de
conscience [which] are perceived in terms of something wrong with so-
ciety that ought to be put right, '60 a category that reminds his reader
of the importance, in Rodes's ethic, of intuition).
He deploys one part of this system or the other to good effect and
as the occasion requires. For example, he considers with some sympa-
thy the passion for deconstruction of the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment, and then applies the latter three-part analysis of values to
conclude that the Crits are not only hegemonic but also nihilistic: If
"the ruling class cannot gain legitimacy by improving its performance,
there is no basis for calling it to account. It can only be replaced by a
different ruling class, one that will be just as subject to false conscious-
ness and just as unaccountable as its predecessor. Meanwhile, the
claim to delegitimize tends to mask the participation of its proponents
58 Mark Van Doren tells of reading to his brother Carl from a draft of Mark's:
[He] would lie on the floor, a pillow doubled under his handsome head,
and read every word I had written since yesterday; and most of the time he
would approve, though one night when he found that I had said'"values"
when the word meant nothing, as usually it does in literary criticism, he
leaped to his feet and said with a kind of moan: "Values!' Good God, you
can't say 'values'! Decide what you mean and then say that!"
THE AuTOBCIRAPHY OF MARK VAN DOREN 99 (1958).
59 RODES, supra note 3, at 126.
60 Id- at 131.
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either in the current ruling class or in the one with which they hope
to replace it."61
He employs the former system (natural law plus "transcendent
values") when he reflects on the fact that American law teachers have
one foot in the university and the other in the market place: "In one
society, we may be too academic-so sophisticated in our analysis of
the transcendent that we lose track of what is actually going on. In
another, we may be too pragmatic-so aware of the things we can
make happen that we hardly stop to think whether they ought to hap-
pen or not. But our situation in today's managerial society is more
problematic than ever, because we are so firmly established as mem-
bers of the ruling class. We are unique in being so large a part of the
problems we are supposed to be solving. "62
Rodes employed both systems in the 1995 conversation, when
Maura Ryan and several others asked him to expand on his notion of
what poverty is. "Today," Ryan said, "liberation theologies are being
pressed to look beyond material oppression.., to seek out the inter-
connections between class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
even age, as elements of oppression .... What does it mean to be
poor? What does it mean to live in poverty?" She suggested that
Rodes's "concept of poverty" does not include enough.63
Rodes's answer seemed to me to be that his concept of poverty is
material and (given that material wealth in one time and place will be
destitution and in another time and place luxury) cultural as well.
And then, as I expected, he invoked his three-part, historical analysis
of values: "I am thinking of material forms of oppression, and particu-
larly.., those forms of oppression which can be reached by the means
available to law .... [When] you turn aside from material concerns,
it's easier to change the way you talk about somebody than it is to
change the way you treat them. I notice, for instance, that whenever
we begin to develop a poor record on racism, we develop a new thing
to call black people .... I saw Derrick Bell's ... proposal [to allow]
white people to pay for the privilege of practicing race discrimina-
tion.64 What that turns out to be is ruling class whites paying ruling
class blacks for the privilege of continuing to oppress the under-
class .... I notice also that the current version of integration coin-
cides with the replacement of capitalism by managerialism, just as the
61 Id. at 94.
62 Id. at 132.
63 Conversation, supra note 5.
64 Rodes later added: "In fairness to Bell, it should be pointed out that his 'propo-
sal' wasn't a serious proposal; it was to make a point about racial attitudes." Id.
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liberty of the slave to work for starvation wages, the same as the free
person, coincides with the passage from feudalism to capitalism." 65
But he finished the thought with a turn to his "transcendent" val-
ues: "Vhat I tell people, in talking about the preferential option for
the poor, is, in any transaction you encounter, look and see who's on
the bottom. What's the effect of this transaction on the people at the
bottom of it? See how you take care of them."66 I put this among
"transcendent" values, as Rodes does, because I see it as scriptural:
Unaided human reason will not lead the thinker to the idea that he
should prefer the poor; he gets there by revelation telling him that God
prefers the poor and that he is called to imitate God.67
R.H. Helmholz and James T. Burtchaell invoked Ryan's question
and Rodes's answer to suggest that his notion of who is poor is similar
to his notion of the shifting of the ruling class. Rodes's historical ob-
servation, Helmholz said, is like the medieval canon law's definition of
a miserabilis persona. That definition was capacious enough (or ambig-
uous enough) so that parents with children and parents without chil-
dren could both be considered miserabiles. (Rodes allowed that that
legal shift was like benefit of clergy in medieval English law.) Rodes,
though, clung to the pragmatic, with an ironic jab from his principal
source for liberation theology: "[Gustavo] Gutierrez said when he was
here that you know in a minute who the rich are, but you spend hours
talking about who the poor are."'6
Rodes's friends endured the irony and persisted in variant ideas
about who the poor are, so much so that, at one point, John R.
Martzell said, "The definitions eat you up."69 A few instances:
* Douglas W. Kmiec suggested that the Augustinian notion of
liberation from poverty should not be understood as liberation from
the love of God (and implied that an over-concentration on material
well-being may enslave or misdirect the poor, toward a materialistic
conception of God). Rodes responded: "To the extent that we are the
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 The test, as the actor Martin Sheen expresses it, is: "Would this decision help
or hurt this person?" Actor Swings to the Left, SOUTH BEND TRm., March 7, 1996, at G12.
The question then is why this (poor) person, rather than that (better off) person,
given that any use of power will help some people and harm others. Imitatio Dei is in
my opinion a sounder theology than the preferential option seen as the consequence
of a particular duty of care, based on relative need, or because we better-off people
have something to learn from the poor. See generally Stephen J. Pope, Proper and Im-
proper Partiality and the Preferential Option for the Poor, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 242
(1993).
68 Conversation, supra note 5.
69 Id.
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beneficiaries of the institutions by which our neighbors are impover-
ished, we are not in a position to talk about selflessness to our neigh-
bors .... What you owe the poor is a reform of the institutions by
which you are enriched and they are impoverished."7 0
* James T. Burtchaell said this debt is even more urgent as "to
those who are in power.... The salvation of the oppressor is at least
as urgent a call on our need to reform social institutions." Rodes: "I
suppose it is. Just as the salvation of bank robbers is a reason for
preventing the robbery of banks. 71
* Leo J. O'Brien invoked Mother Teresa on poverty of spirit.
(Burtchaell had quoted her to say that the United States was the
poorest country in the world.) Patrick Gaffney helped Rodes out: "A
Marxist would say, in the social and economic situation that we are
in,... that argument in itself becomes a form of false consciousness.
To de-materialize poverty is something you do when you're wealthy. '72
* Paul J. Weithman suggested that the poor are those who are
unloved, but, he said, "the injunction to give to the poor in material
terms is going to be a very strong rule of thumb... ; a way of showing
them our love.... If we give our stuff to them without loving them,
we haven't done, ultimately, what we're supposed to do. 73 But, fi-
nally and stubbornly, Rodes declined such oil for his troubled waters
and returned to what I have identified as his three-part historical
sense of what "values" means, and to being historian as lawyer: "Being
entitled to charity is a contradiction in terms. What the poor are enti-
tled to is justice . . , a reform of the institutions by which they are
impoverished. For those of us who are lawyers, they are entitled to the
deployment of our professional skills, as best we can deploy them, to
that end. Having decided to what end my professional skills should be
employed, I can go home, and let somebody else worry about the rest
of it."
' 7 4
V. THE "WIDER SOCIET'
My suspicion has been that when Rodes talks about the ruling
class being accountable to the "wider society," the aggregation of peo-
ple he imagines listening to the accounting of their masters is political
and geographical: It is those living in a modern, Western nation-state.
He accepted this, when I put it to him, as I prepared this Essay. He
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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wrote me a note: "I mean the society governed by whatever laws or
proposed laws I am scrutinizing." But, he added, "Certainly, the flour-
ishing of subordinate communities is one of the values to be consid-
ered, in any such scrutiny. '7 5 Perhaps he would agree with Karl Barth:
"God meets us where He has put us," 76 but Rodes's notion of where
he has been put by God is America; after that, his theory about com-
munities is as pragmatic as his notion of who the poor are.
Ryan suggested to him that his jurisprudence is individualistic,
that most of us who set out to look a little way down the road need
more support from our organic (not political) community than Rodes
seems to need: "I think that someone like Gutierrez would say you
have to begin and end in a community of faith, because otherwise you
can't do it .... We can't send the students . . . out into the world
without a praying community to which they're constantly related....
I think that's one of the practical problems we have as a university,
that we do send students out into a world, to live in a certain way, and
they don't necessarily have much support."77 In other words (and I
admit to putting a spin on Ryan's point), New Testament discipleship
is not played out primarily in reference to the modem nation-state.
Rodes would not accept Ryan's suggestion that a congregation of
believers is particularly significant even as a praying community, let
alone as a place of moral discernment-this even though he is a man
of prayer and a faithful member of his local parish church. In the
conversation, he described-in an informal, thumbnail way his conver-
sion from the Episcopal Church to the Roman Catholic Church as he
found it in post-World War II Boston. He describes this change as a
private journey; if it was, to use his image, a pilgrimage, it was not a
journey in company. The account seems to me enlightening with re-
gard to what the theologians would call his ecclesiology, and, from
there, enlightening with regard to his jurisprudence:
"I went to the Church of the Advent in Boston, and I spent a
summer reading some fairly obscure stuff and ended up wanting to be
a Roman Catholic, and said good-bye to the Church of the Advent and
went padding out to the church at the foot of the hills near Jeanne's
house and said, 'I want to be a Catholic.' [The person I talked to
there] said, 'Do you want to take instructions?' I said, 'No. I don't
want to take instructions. I want to be a Catholic.' Finally, one [Fa-
75 Letter from Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame,
to Thomas L. Shaffer, Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus, University
of Notre Dame (July 26, 1997) (on file with author).
76 KARL BARTH, ETHICS 190 (Geoffrey W. Bromiley trans., 1981).
77 Conversation, supra note 5.
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ther] ArthurJ. Dunigan, curate of St.Joseph's in Belmont, showed up,
and-I think from nine in the evening until about two in the morn-
ing-we talked, and I ended up persuading him that I knew enough
to be a Catholic, being as how the difference between what I had been
and what I wanted to be was very narrow, and I'd already read about it.
"So he got a guy out of bed to sponsor me in conditional bap-
tism.... He shook my hand and said I was now one with Augustine
andJerome... and off I went. And the next Sunday I went to mass at
the church nearest where I lived. I didn't like that too much. There
was a Polish church just down the street, and, except for the fact that
they said the 'Hail Mary' in Polish, I liked it better. And here I am."78
After conversion, then, as much as before, the worshiping congre-
gation was incidental to personal sacramental observance. It was not
significantly or uniquely a place to join in communal worship, let
alone communal moral witness. Nor was it, nor did it become, a place
of moral discernment. Organic ecclesial communities (which, I think,
are what Ryan was asking about) are fungible for Rodes, and none of
them is in any but a sacerdotal way what Rodes means when he talks
about the church.
In the conversation, I thought for a moment that perhaps he
meant that one's being a member of a geographical parish might be a
place to begin thinking that God finds us where He puts us. "Ve're
plopped down into a parish structure-at least in the Roman Catholic
Church-and we just about have to make something of it," I said
(asked). Rodes said, 'Vell, you never used to [have to] be.... All you
did at the parish was go to mass."
"What Maura is pressing you to say," I said, "is that this journey
[pilgrimage, I meant] you talk about, that you are working on in Pil-
grim Law, this picking one another up, encouraging one another, wit-
nessing, politicking-it implies companions."
"Oh, absolutely," he said. "I look around this room and see them
all over .... But perhaps, pursuant to my Erastian proclivities [of
which more below], I see the various kinds of civil community in
which I participate as part of the community structure in which I
live.., so that I am not as interested in the idea of a particular, local-
ized faith community .... I am more inclined to find community
where I find it. I am very skeptical [for example] of the effort to bring
the Latin American base-community movement into the United
States, because it tends to be elitist in the United States, whereas it is
78 Id.
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not in Latin America. The only people that talk about base communi-
ties, that I know of, are university faculty. '79
The place in which Rodes might imagine the ruling class making
its accounting to "the wider society" is, then, probably not a Christian
congregation. It is probably not a neighborhood or town, either. It is
more likely a place from which both the people of God and the polit-
ical society are seen more broadly. And, given that he defines his play-
ing field by legal order, it is ultimately and definitionally the modem
nation-state.
Much of Rodes's scholarship has been in the field American legal
academics call "the law of church and state." (His interest in that field
is how he accounts for taking up the history of the established church
in England.80) And while he says that, when church and state part
ways, he will go with the church, the foundation of his church-state
theory is that the two are so intertwined-so much the remnant of
Christendom-that they could not part even if they wanted to.8 1
That is a strikingly unique position among Rodes's contemporar-
ies in the church-state field. It leads Rodes to treat the church less as
the people of God than as a cultural institution. Or, to be fair, to treat
political culture as manifested both in the nation-state and in organ-
ized religious activity-the ruling class as evident in one place as in
the other, the oppressed as oppressed in one place as in the other,
and the manner of discourse about the same in both places and in
places that are as much the state as they are the church, and vice
versa. "It is not so much a matter of the way things are," he said, "as it
is a matter of how you choose to look at it. And I choose to look at it
this way ... The structures of the church, like the structures of the
state, are a problem for the Christian living in the world. The whole
idea of Christendom is that church and state are institutions with
which the Christian must deal."82
79 Id.
80 Rodes chose the English church because of its adherence to medieval Christen-
dom. "Both the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation involved a return to first
principles... whereas the English experience was a constant [effort] to update the
original nexus, so that all of the changes were incremental.... I have the idea of
church and state as an integral phenomenon." Id.
81 Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pluralist Christendom and the Christian Civil Magistrate, 8
CAP. U. L. REv. 413 (1979); Law, History, and the Option for the Poor, 8 LOGOS (USA)
61 (1985) and 9 CoMMuNmo 321 (1982).
82 Conversation, supra note 5.
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John Garvey noticed that, in political rhetoric (and other Ameri-
can-lawyer rhetoric), there are two institutional languages, "especially
among mainline Christian lawyers who are embarrassed at the idea of
talking about Jesus in elections.... The usual kinds of arguments
against pitching your candidate or your platform in Christian terms
are, one .... that.., it would sell better if you appealed to utility.
And, two, that it might be offensive to the other guys."83
Rodes insisted on the remnants of Christendom, even as a matter
of language: To the extent that public moral discourse in America is
coherent at all, it remains significantly religious. For example: "The
translation Jack [Martzell] referred to, natural law as about people, is
one that I would make more easily along religious lines than I can
along philosophical lines. That is, if you line up ten people chosen at
random and ask them whether they think people should love their
neighbors, they'll all say, 'Yes,' despite the fact that this is not a philo-
sophical principle; it is a principle of theology. There is probably no
philosophical principle that will command as much allegiance....
The kind of society that Christianity supposes is one of fairly broad
appeal. That is why I keep quoting Gaudium et Spes.... If you take it
seriously, if you start talking about joys and hopes, griefs and anxie-
ties, you're talking Christianity; you're not talking anything else....
That's what you ought to talk about."8 4
Rodes's ecclesiology led him, as he worked out his early church-
state theory, to encounter the political theology of the late Father
John Courtney Murray, S.J.8 5 Rodes said: "I took exception to his
views. I noted that he and I were having the same difference of opin-
ion that was going on between the clergy and the laity in the medieval
period. That is, the clergy tended then.., as it tended thirty years
ago, to believe that nothing could be religion once it was run by a
layman. I felt that Murray, because he was a priest, was able to sepa-
rate his life as a Christian from his life as a student of secular institu-
tions, in a way that I as a layman, being in secular institutions, could
not .... 8
6
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 In my horseback understanding of Murray's project He thought that natural-
law moral argument, from Catholic theology but not identified as such, could be a
language for political dialogue with American Protestants. See generally JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY AND THE GROWTH OF TRADITION (J. Leon Hooper, S.J. & Todd
David Whitmore eds., 1996), especially therein Jean Porter, In the Wake of a Doctrine: A
Reassessment of the Doctrine of Natural Law as Developed in We Hold These Truths, at 24.
86 Rodes later noted, "I wrote Murray along these lines with a reprint of an arti-
cle. I still remember with gratitude the kindness and generosity of his response, en-
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"The separation of church and religion, on the one hand, and
clergy, on the other, is basic to medieval thought, and it is the way I
would respond to the notion that the state is a problem for the church
and the church a problem for the state.... Murray's notion of civic
friendship didn't take with me... because my understanding of soci-
ety is more familial: You choose your friends, but you don't choose
your relatives. There are a lot of people involved in political life in the
United States that I can understand as my relatives, but not as my
friends. I prefer the model of relatives throwing the family china at
one another to Murray's model of civic friendship."87
Douglas Kmiec suggested (what I have often thought) that Mur-
ray's project was benignly disingenuous, "so, that it was this natural-law
talk, without revelation .... with always this winking going on to the
Catholics: 'I'm still okay. I know that revelation really moves this pro-
ject.' 88 Rodes said, "That is a way in which Murray's philosophy
could be experienced.... It isn't my experience of him.... Murray
has a critique [in which he asks], 'Are the principles of religious free-
dom articles of faith or articles of peace?' He comes down saying they
are articles of peace. Now I think, if you follow Gaudium et Spes, that
they are articles of faith .... [One might be asked,] 'What are you
doing imposing [your] religion on other people?' [My answer is,]
'Freedom of religion is, for me, a religious principle. Therefore, to
the extent I make religious freedom good in society, I am imposing
my religion on other people.' '8 9
Drew Christiansen wondered, given the inadequacy of natural-law
language in political discourse, about more advertent and focused
religious witness. Rodes, he said, comes "to the point of talking about
the new humanity, and how the achievement is not our own.... The
people you are in dialogue with-Father Burtchaell, [John Howard]
Yoder, maybe [Stanley] Hauerwas-would suggest that the new hu-
manity ought to have an influence on the law now. It is not just there
in mystery for the future, but it ought to have some bearing on
society."90
couraging me to keep working on a line of thought so different from his own."
Conversation, supra note 5.
87 Id. If each of these is in some circumstances the sort of organic community
Ryan suggested, neither is for Rodes a place of moral discernment.
88 Id; see alsoJ. Leon Hooper, Theological Sources ofJohn Courtney Murray's Ethics, 57
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 19 (1996). But see Thomas Hughson, S.J., John Courtney Murray
and Postconciliar Faith, 58 THEOLOGICAL SruD. 480 (1997).
89 Conversation, supra note 5.
90 Id.
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Rodes, of course, would not deny that. (In Pilgrim Law, he de-
pends on Roman Catholic social teaching as announced by the U.S.
Catholic Bishops, and quotes at some length a poetic pastoral letter of
the Appalachian Bishops.9 1) But, he said, he is more comfortable
thinking of Christian lawyering as prosaic (what I would call Wednes-
day afternoon law practice) than as the broad, prophetic witness
Christiansen (who works for the U.S. Catholic Bishops) may have had
in mind. "The scriptural picture of a new humanity has bearing on
society," he said, "but if you look at the concrete case, the human
condition runs to certain things, including tragedy. The way I got into
the pilgrim-law project was to worry about natural law as being inade-
quately equipped to deal with tragedy. That is, natural law is based on
the state from which we have fallen; we are called to return to some
other state-which is consistent with our nature, but it is not simply
where we came from. We're not going back. But we don't know any
more about it than that. At the same time we're on ajourney in com-
pany, and it's our business, with the law, as with other tools, to pick
each other up when we fall."92
Michael Baxter, apparently putting together Christiansen's ques-
tion and Rodes's view on the limits of natural law, wondered about a
theory of the common good-a concept that was important to Murray
and that Rodes has tended to approach with caution. 93 "This com-
mon good is not operative, not palpably felt by many people in soci-
ety," Baxter said. "Society is skewed, so that we're somehow in a
situation where we live in a life where there is not human flourishing,
in the way there should be. Then you call for an attempt to restore the
common good. I read this point as very much pointing toward what
Murray was trying to do.... Murray sort of pictured himself in this
scenario in which... America is in trouble, on the brink of barbarism,
and the Catholics are going to be the ones to restore stability to the
public. And they're going to do it by reasserting the grounds on
which it was really formed. That would be some notion of natural law
as a common good.
"I question, when I read Murray .... what we do with the possibil-
ity that trying to restore the sense of the common good won't work. I
might connect this question to your comment that in the medieval
synthesis there was a sense of organic unity of church and state.... It
91 RODES, supra note 3, at 163-66 (quoting This Land is Home to Me, in RENEWING
ThE EARTH: CATHOLIC DocuMENTs ON PEACE, JUSTICE AND LIBERATION 472 (David J.
O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1977)).
92 Conversation, supra note 5.
93 See RODES, supra note 3, at 37-44.
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occurs to me that [a] notion of organic society suffused with princi-
ples of religion and justice and the natural law-even though it's
based on the natural law, ... on the notion of the common good-
... may, in this society, end up looking counter-cultural. It might end
up looking... a lot more apocalyptic than Murray or you might want
it to."94
Rodes might at that point have invoked his reworked Marxism,
but he didn't. He said, "The kind of thing I am talking about is not an
empirical observation. It's a choice. I choose to treat the society in
which I live as this kind of society, rather than that kind of society. We
might end up with a situation where that choice is no longer rational.
But I don't think we're there yet. We are now at a point where you
can choose.... I choose to treat it this way."'95 He seemed to me to
imply that neither common-good theory nor Murray's political theol-
ogy were necessary to his choice, a choice he identifies as
Constantinian. 96
Martzell then suggested that the "melding of religion and govern-
ment never comes to anything but grief." Rodes's view of that possibil-
ity, much like his view of the class dialectic, is that such "melding" is a
given: "There is no government that is free from some kind of reli-
gion." The original idea of religious freedom in America, he said, was
that all churches in the United States had the same position as dissent-
ing churches in England. "There was a basic Christian doctrine, with-
out a single coercive institutional or liturgical expression. We lived
with that until fairly far along in this century, until we began including
94 Conversation, supra note 5.
95 Id.
96 "My approach is irretrievably Constantinian and will go on being." Id. The
substance of this is, I think, in what Rodes calls Erastianism. But the use of Constan-
tine is, as John Howard Yoder puts it, a symbol:
During the Christian Middle Ages Constantine became [a] symbol .... The
assumption [about him] tends to be that in order to continue being a sover-
eign, he [needed] to continue to act the way a (non-Christian) sovereign
"naturally" acts, thereby creating some tension with what the latter prophets
and Jesus taught about domination, wealth, and violence.
JOHN Ho-ARD YODER, THE PRIESrLY KiNGDOM 82 (1984). More specifically (in a note
to the statement I quote here), Yoder writes that Constantine was "the first Roman
emperor to tolerate, then to favor, and then to participate in the administration of
the Christian churches." Constantine then became, for later centuries, a symbol
hailed by "mainstream" theologians and historians from Eusebius onward, and regret-
ted by "radical historians" who argued "that the change was not all for the good." Id.
at 201-02 n.4.
Rodes's genius in Pilgrim Law is to combine the claim he makes about being a
Constantinian with a Marxist analysis of legal and economic history-to, in other
words, turn the Emperor Constantine into a dissenter.
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more and more people in the synthesis, and it began to become
threadbare.
"My own notion here is that, in the way our class dialectic has
developed, as the managerial class has become the ruling class, we
have excluded religion, because the power of the managerial class is
based on expertise, and religion is one of the few ways a layman can
challenge an expert. And therefore the security of the power of ex-
pertise is maintained by a general exclusion of ideology. Most ideol-
ogy is religious."97 That is, Constantinians would, if they could,
subvert the ruling class.98
I found this exchange insightful and stimulating, but I should
add from Pilgrim Law that Rodes has for a long time held to a coher-
ent theory of the church that makes what he said in the conversation
more understandable. He has argued that the church as an institu-
tion takes on two different "forms" in the culture. One of these is an
"Erastianism," in which there are few or no functional or principled
distinctions between church and state.99 "There is a Christian way of
running the church, and a non-Christian way.... That is what I call
the Erastian outlook. It is what I have gotten out of Anglicanism as an
update of the medieval synthesis. The question is: Is the medieval syn-
thesis worth saving? If I were a clergyman, I would say, 'No.' But, as a
lawyer, I am inclined to want to hang in with it a little longer.... The
response to religious pluralism in the whole rest of the Christian
world [has been] to privatize religion. The whole skill of my own pro-
fession was devoted in England to avoiding that solution. The avoid-
97 Conversation, supra note 5.
98 It probably began (begins) with a bid for the cooperative influence on which
Erastian success depends: "[T]he mainline church's core problem: The Chris-
tendomesque aspiration to be a respected, mainstream cultural authority dominating
every Main Street in a properly Christianized society." Christian Smith, Book Review,
54 THEOLOGY TODAY 258, 260 (1997). Rodes often seems to me to discount the dan-
ger that Christian faith would then disappear into secular culture. See, e.g., Charles R.
Morris, A Tale of Two Dioceses, COMMONWEAL, June 6, 1997, at 11, 18 ("[O]nly 'high-
tension' religions prosper in America. Once a religion assimilates to the culture, it
almost invariably diminishes into a social center or a kind of low-cost group therapy.
There are now fewer Episcopalians in America than there are Catholics in Los Ange-
les."). This is a rather different risk than the one he identifies as the managerial
class's excluding religion.
99 "Erastus [1524-83] was a Swiss theologian who taught that the church had no
proper coercive jurisdiction independent of the civil magistrate. His name became
attached to those Anglicans who were content with the substantial role played by
Crown and Parliament in the affairs of their church." RODES, supra note 3, at 141.
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ance was at least in part successful. I think we are now in a period in
which the privatization of religion is coming unstuck.... It is now
being seriously contended that no religiously motivated measure is le-
gitimate.... If you are going to be a religious person, you have got to
have religious motivations in your actions in the world."'00
The other form is the "High Church" form, in which the church
is seen as, or sees itself as, separate enough from the culture around it
to be able to be to the society what the Hebrew Prophets were to
Israel. Each of these forms has had legal expression in Britain and in
the United States. The tension between them expresses for Rodes
much of what it means to be a modem Christian lawyer. The Erastian
end of the tension includes "any view of the church as one of the
complex of institutions, public and private, through which Christians
hope to implement an agenda for the whole society in a given time
and place."' 0 The high-church end of the tension is "the vision of
the church as standing over against society."'0 2 "[I] t points to human
purposes beyond the reach of society, and to social shortcomings for
which society has no remedy. These include... eternal salvation...,
the final consummation of history, and the fact that the world as we
know it is not the Kingdom of God.... [I] n the Gilded Age of capital-
ism, the witness was against greed, selfishness, and ostentation. To-
day, it is against anomie, licentiousness, destruction of the
environment, and marginalization of the poor."'0 3
VII. CAREER CHOICES
Seven of those who joined in the 1995 conversation were Rodes's
students and three of them have practiced law with him. Their profes-
sional careers range from trial practice (John Martzell and Paul Titus)
to legal-aid practice (Angelika Mueller), to teaching (G. Robert
Blakey, Mary Kate Kearney, David T. Link, and Thomas Shaffer), and
to service in the church (Gerard Powers). As they joined in the juris-
prudential discussion, they recognized Rodes's influence on them
when they were in his classes: "What I remember most is a comment
he made on the first day of law school," Kearney said. "'Think about
who you are .. .and remember who that person is .... When you
leave... make sure you take part of the person you brought into this
law school, with those ideals and those aspirations, out with you.
Make sure that part of what the law school does is help bring out those
100 Conversation, supra note 5.
101 I&
102 Id.
103 RODES, supra note 3, at 142-43.
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ideals and aspirations.' That is a message I have always remembered,
and, as a law teacher now myself, it's a message I give my students on
the first day of class.' u0 4
Martzell remembered two lessons: "Natural law comes from the
nature of man.... Law is about people," and, "Law is God-centered,
but centered through man." Link, who is Dean of the Notre Dame
Law School, said that if the student vote on teacher of the year comes
to be taken "about four years after law school, then Rodes will get it
every time." (That brings to my mind an observation made by the late
Dean Joseph O'Meara, who persuaded Rodes to come to Notre Dame
and who was Link's and my law dean: "Rodes has a long fuse.") Link,
who was a corporate practitioner before he became an educator, said
Rodes "taught me how to think about corporations, and about my cli-
ent, and my client's responsibilities." 0 5
Titus also remembered two lessons: "Bob was the great propo-
nent of self-help.... There may be easier ways to do things than
going into court. That is one thing.... The other one was his view of
corporations, and that is that, contrary to what our professional-code
teachers say, when we represent a corporation, we represent an entity.
Bob always said, 'You don't. You represent people.' I think that's
right. I think in corporate practice it has been a valuable insight.
Sometimes . . . it is constituencies, but you're always representing
people.' 06
David Rodes pointed out that law firms are teaching institutions,
for good or for ill. "Before you have the kind of influence that Dean
Link could have, in this day and age, it takes eight to ten years, and
probably a lot of luck." Meanwhile the firm is teaching its own (ruling
class) doctrine to its young lawyers. "That makes it very important to
have a teacher in your background that can make a strong and lasting
impression," he said. "That's what my father has done for me.' 0 7
Powers said Rodes is "sort of the 'Crit' of the Notre Dame Law
School, [although] his prescriptions are somewhat conservative and,
at best, reformist, in terms of what he would do about the injustices he
criticizes from a very radical perspective. In looking forward, he's very
much a reformist-in part, I think, because he argues, 'You're not
going to eliminate these bureaucracies; they'll continue to recreate
themselves. And so a radical critique isn't very helpful.... Instead
you have to push at changing the structure when you can, knowing
104 Conversation, supra note 5.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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that you might succeed at one point, but, then, you might create new
problems which you'll have to address again....' But the critique is
quite radical. So ... I see some sense in how you can trash the corpo-
rations, in terms of your analysis, but still go to work for them.... -"08
Powers identified Rodes's theory of legal careers. Rodes assumes
that students in his upper-division, required ethics course will repre-
sent and advise the ruling class. He says to his students, 'You won't be
listened to all the time, but you'll be listened to some of the time." He
adds: "I have said, over and over, that the burdens on the poor are
being fashioned in the corporate law offices faster than they can be
alleviated in the public-interest offices. If you go into the corporate
law offices with the preferential option for the poor in mind, you may
not do a lot, but you can always do something."'0 9
He regularly tells formal and informal gatherings of students that
what Powers called his "radical critique" is not a recommendation that
they serve the poor as lawyers for the poor. He prefers that his stu-
dents accept their almost unavoidable orientation toward law offices
that represent business clients. He does not think they need to aim at
public-interest jobs, and he often seems to say that he would prefer
that they do not aim at representing poor people in the courts. He
seems to prefer the thought that his students will represent poor peo-
ple to their clients.110
He recognizes the fact-which any corporate lawyer would say is a
fact-that business lawyers have moral influence on their clients. He
argues that the ruling class are bureaucrats, notably including corpo-
rate managers. And then he claims that the way to practice the prefer-
ential option for the poor is as ascesis, discipline-and that the place
to practice the preferential option for the poor is in the relationship
between business lawyer and business client."' And this even with the
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Rodes is kind enough to credit this point to me, and to refer to an anecdote or
two I have written about, from my own years in a corporate law firm. See THOMAS L.
SAFFER, FArH AND THE PROFESSIONS 131-40 (1987).
111 Thomas Kohler was less romantic about his memories of being a corporate
lawyer. "As an associate, I had absolutely no power .... I once refused to sign a
challenge to the conduct of a National Labor Relations Board election, and that al-
most ended my time there." He said he had two problems with Rodes's theory of
using natural law as the measure of law practice: "One of them is, How do you talk to
outsiders for whom these are not legitimate questions.... So that there is no telos for
the person. ... The second is, How do we recapture the natural-law tradition in a
fashion such that we can begin to move forward with it?" Both questions, as well as the
aspiration that natural law is a linguafranca for moral discourse in America, he said,
are about how to talk to people (e.g., clients) "who are not convinced that you even
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understanding that the objective is "to go over the heads of the ruling
class to the real people."112
Patrick Gaffney, William M. Lewers, and John T. Noonan, Jr. did
not argue with the possibility of influence on which this career-choice
theory depends. They instead turned to the current situation of
young lawyers who might be following such advice-something Ryan
had suggested when she asked Rodes about communities to support
the people she and he train. Gaffney, a Holy Cross priest who teaches
anthropology to undergraduate pre-law majors, said that he wondered
"whether the discrepancy Gerry [Powers] points out, between a radi-
cal analysis of the legal profession.., and.., a reformist solution that
[says] you need to work with institutions, leads to disorientation-in-
ability to work-because you have to pay off your debts.... There is a
sense [among graduates he talks to] that they have been given the
wrong advice."1 13
The wrong advice, most evidently, Lewers and Noonan said, be-
cause these lawyers end up being unhappy. "Some of the stories I
heard this afternoon, about corporate law practice, may relate back to
an earlier era," Lewers said. "I am not sure they are quite possible in
the large law firms we know today." Noonan said he "wondered
whether the law school does not have some obligation to try to create
a counter-environment.... Bob's writing, particularly on law and lib-
eration, sort of predicts this is what is going to happen; this is the way
the culture is going .... It is really awful for the law schools to be
turning out excellent people who are not satisfied with their lives.
Nearly all of them," referring to those who have been his law clerks,
"are unhappy people. The metaphor has been expressed: strip-min-
ing the brightest young people in America. That is what the corpo-
have questions they want to hear." Rodes's answer to this was partly the sort of cri-
tique Powers identified, and partly an appeal to something more revolutionary:
Our politics is based on two factions of the ruling class trying to appropriate
the outrage of the whole society with the whole class. Somehow the corpo-
rate wing has been winning. But it is possible to go over the heads of the
ruling class to the real people.... One way or another it has to be done.
Conversation, supra note 5.
112 Id. David Burrell picked up on a couple of Rodes's illustrative anecdotes from
in-house corporate law practice; he told about a telephone-company lawyer who
threatened to resign over his client's mistreatment of women-and his client re-
lented. "He saw himself as a kind of prophetic part of management-for the good of
the company." Rodes accepted the story but pointed out that the particular situation
of the lawyer in such a business story is that the lawyer has a discursive advantage:
"Such a lawyer is in part exercising simple management responsibility, which any
other officer could exercise. But, in addition, lawyers threaten with the law." Id.
113 Id.
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rate law firms seem to be doing." Link said, perhaps gently referring
to Rodes's jurisprudence as it compares with his advice on career
choices, "We're teaching them one thing and then putting them into
a position where they cannot exercise the choices being discussed with
them."'11
4
Rodes's position on his students' career choices displays his high
view of lawyering (as distinguished from law). Law is measured, at best,
from perceptions of human nature, perceptions that cannot account
for tragedy, for what Chesterton called desperate circumstance. But a
lawyer's work in human relationship with her clients is not limited in
the same way. In Pilgrim Law, he suggests that living in the daily rela-
tionships of law practice (that follow from a career choice) may not
employ his theoretical distinction between ajurisprudence resting on
natural law and the "transcendent values" that measure a life but do
not measure the adequacy of the law: "In our personal moral life, to
be sure, it makes sense to include our eschatological calling, our spiri-
tual journey into the unknown, among the requirements of our na-
ture, and to try to make a harmonious synthesis of the whole. But
structuring the intervention of the civil magistrate in the process-
which is what jurisprudence is about-is a very different matter."1 5
Ascesis is, then, possible in a law office-even ascesis guided by such
witness to the ruling class as the preferential option for the poor. Ca-
reer is less important than the way a lawyer deals with a client-both
of them oppressors of the poor, both of them called to liberate one
another from being oppressors.
Rodes's theory on career choice comes across as more prosaic
than his jurisprudence. It is tempting for me to think that it is not
dependent on his jurisprudence, nor his jurisprudence dependent on
it. So tempted, I might speak more for myself than for him and think
that training altruistic young people for service to business, and then
arranging our institutional finances so that these young people are in
thrall to lenders (in amounts approaching one hundred thousand
dollars each at graduation), and thereby feel that they are denied em-
ployment for poor people in a traditional professional way, is a dis-
turbing moral problem.
But it might be more instructive to see Rodes's theory on career
choice-which is, operationally, a theory on what to say to students
about how to be Christians and lawyers in the twenty-first century-as
114 Id.
115 RODES, supra note 3, at xiii.
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the way he pulls together the elements of his jurisprudence that are
fitted into Pilgrim Law and that came up in the conversation:
* His teaching on the exercise of moral influence on business
clients-the moral influence reflecting his powerful assertion of the
preferential option for the poor.
* A theology of hope that says the liberation of the oppressor is
as important as the liberation of the oppressed.
* His teaching on the ambivalence of history-that the solutions
of yesterday were the beginnings of the injustices of today, and those
of today contain the beginnings of future injustice.
* His reflection on how a Christian might practice law within the
class dialectic (an Erastian enterprise, I think).
* The interplay, as he sees them, of ruling-class, independent,
and inchoate values.
* Natural law, as he sees it operating in a handicapped way in the
formation of law (jurisprudence narrowly understood) and, aug-
mented by transcendent values, in the relationship between a lawyer
and her business client.
* The way he sees accountability operating not so much within
the church as against it.
Thinking of advice on career choice as a focus, rather than a pro-
posal for debate among teachers, justifies and provides the substance
of a lawyer's moral influence within the ruling class, as it also permits
a business lawyer, pursuing such an agenda, to tell herself that she is
acting for the best interests of her client (who is, after all, paying her
well enough that she can hold the money lenders at bay).
I don't know whether this focus relieves the concern Gaffney
identified; I doubt that it offers comfort for the anomie Noonan and
Lewers spoke of. And I can imagine a critic wondering whether
Rodes's theory on career choices might come to a different emphasis
(or perhaps a different set of qualifications) if he were to submit it to
the discernment of an organic Christian community. On the other
hand that may be what he did at Notre Dame in the spring of 1995.
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